Income distribution and poverty through crisis and adjustment by Altimir, Oscar
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AM) TEE CARIBBEAN 
it! ' 
m : -1 •' 
-
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY 
THROUGH CRISIS AND ADJUSTMENT 
Oscar Altimir* 
Economic Development Division 
Working Paper No.15** 
September 1993 
* Director of the Economic Development Division of ECLAC. The 
views expressed are his responsibility and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the United Nations» He wishes to express his 
thanks for the valuable comments of Robert Devlin, Norberto Garcia 
and Arturo León, as well as the skillful assistance of Gloria 
Bensan and Guillermo Mundt, without holding them responsible for 
the end results. 
** The purpose of the papers in this series is to provide a 
preliminary report on ECLAC research findings as a basis for 
comments and suggestions. This publication is not an official 
document and has therefore been reproduced without formal editing. 




Working Paper - ECLAC, N* 15 
September 1993 C. 1 

i i i 
CONTENTS 
Page 
Resumen...» . <>.... v 
1 • x n^iroduc t x on 1 
2 o Til© &]3jp2rOclCl!l • • • « • • • 0 e « f i « « « o » « e « o o o e a « « e « « o « « « « e « t « * « i * * * e 2 
3. The record of the 1970s 8 
4. The 1980s: a tale of ten countries 9 
5. Rural poverty 17 
6. Transient and permanent changes of income distribution.. 18 
7. Prospects for poverty alleviation 24 
8. Conclusions 26 
Tables 29 
References 39 
Annex table A.l 45 




Este documento analiza los costos distributivos de la crisis 
y los ajustas de los años ochenta,, así como los efectos de la 
recuperación y ©1 ingreso a senderos de crecimiento sostenido. Para 
ello s® basa en pares comparables de estimaciones de la 
distribución del ingreso y en las estimaciones de pobreza de la 
CEPAL, para los diez países mayores de la región, predominantemente 
urbanos. El método de análisis consiste en comparar cambios 
distributivos y cambios en variables macroeconómicas y del mercado 
de trabajo durante fases macroeconómicas similares a lo largo del 
proceso de ajuste en diferentes países y, por otro lado, en 
comparar las situaciones distributivas en cada país, antes y 
después del ajuste. Se concluye que, si bien la recuperación y el 
abatimiento de la inflación están aliviando las situaciones de 
pobreza, el crecimiento de mediano plazo sin mejoramiento de la 
distribución del ingreso representará un proceso demasiado largo de 
reducción de la pobreza, y que hay bases para sospechar que la 
nueva modalidad de funcionamiento y las nuevas reglas de política 





Most Latin American countries are painfully recovering from 
the protracted crisis they suffered during the 1980s and from the 
traumatic adjustments they had to undergo in order to extricate 
themselves from it and to lay the bases for a new phase of 
sustained growth. 
The net transfer of resources to the region, which before the 
crisis represented more than 2% of its GDP, suddenly became 
negative. Between 1982 and 1989, Latin American countries' net 
export of capital was equivalent to almost 4% of their aggregate 
GDP. The turnaround of the net transfer of resources was thus 
tantamount to a permanent pressure of 6% on domestic resources 
along the period. 
After the external adjustment and recession that brought 
regional per capita product down 10% between 1980 and 1983, most 
Latin American economies wavered between recession and inflation, 
muddling through the debt tangle and its domestic sequels for most 
of the decade. At its closing, per capita product was still at the 
1983 level and real national income per capita was 15% lower than 
in 1980. However, in 1991-1992 growth has been steadier, there have 
been signs of a reanimation of private investment along with the 
return of significant capital flows, the trend to price 
stabilization has generalized and most of the huge fiscal 
adjustments of the previous years have held fast. 
Although in some cases stabilization processes still display 
some fragility, most Latin American economies are now working on 
new foundations. These are characterized by a firmer orientation 
towards exports (whose volume has, in many cases, at least doubled 
during the past decade), trade liberalization, fiscal austerity, 
more prudent management of monetary policy and greater reluctance 
to resort to public regulation of economic activity. 
For the poor and the lower-middle income groups, the severe 
economic crisis of the 1980s involved damaging declines both in 
real incomes and in access to and quality of social services. 
Almost all countries experienced acute redistributions of income 
among households during the decade of crisis, in most cases with 
regressive net outcomes at the end of the decade. On the other 
hand, regressive changes in relative incomes and the fall of real 
per capita income during the first half of the decade, when most 
economies suffered recessionary adjustments, or had just begun to 
recover, involved significant increases in absolute poverty, which 
only in a few cases were partially reversed with the stabilization 
and growth processes of the latter years. 
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Estimates for Latin America as a whole (ECLAC, 1991 and 
ECLAC, 1992) put at 41% the population living in poverty in 1980, 
increasing to 43% in 1986 and reaching 46% in 1990. Corresponding 
estimates of poverty incidence among households increased from 35% 
in 1980 to 37% in 1986 and 39% in 1990. This deterioration, 
however,, is almost entirely attributed to the aggravation of urban 
poverty, which affected 25% of urban households in 1980, 30% in 
1986 and 34% in 1990. This almost doubled the absolute numbers 
living in poverty in the urban areas, to 22.7 million households 
and 115.5 million people in 1990 (see table 2). 
In contrast, the incidence of rural poverty in the region as 
a whole remained more or less stable during the decade, close to 54% of households and 60% of the rural population, with absolute 
numbers increasing slightly more than 1% a year, to 80 million 
people. Consequently, around 60% of the Latin American poor are now 
concentrated in urban areas, compared with less than half in 1980. 
Recovery and the abatement of inflation are bringing relief 
on the poverty front, but there is increasing room for the 
suspicion that the new modality under which the economies are 
functioning and the new rules of public policy involve greater 
income inequalities and more precarious employment situations than 
in the past, in a certainly tighter fiscal environment. 
1. The approach. 
a) The database on income distribution and poverty. 
Income distribution statistics in Latin America are of varied 
reliability and not straightforwardly comparable1. Among the many 
factors distorting their comparability, underestimation of income 
affects differently both income levels and their concentration. In 
order to somehow sidestep this obstacle, the analysis of changes in 
the relative distribution of income is based on pairs of available 
estimates (which can be seen in table 4) , selected for being 
similar -and, therefore, apparently comparable- with regard to the 
income concept, the technique for measuring income and the 
geographical coverage of the surveys used to collect the data, as 
well as to the units and criteria used by the respective authors in 
processing or adjusting the survey data2. However, proven or 
1 See Altimir (1987) for a review and discussion of the reliability of 
income measurements from different types of surveys in Latin America and of their 
comparability problems. 
2 For a detailed compilation of the income distribution statistics available 
for each country and the selection of comparable pairs, see Altimir (1992). In 
particular the selection based on the similarity of data and their treatment 
allows one to compare Gini coefficients - and calculate their variations, as done 
in table 4 - which have been computed on the basis of similarly grouped data. 
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assumed differences in any of these aspects in many cases 
invalidate going beyond these pair-wise comparisons into simply 
pooling estimates., 
Poverty estimates for the 1980s are those produced by ECLAC 
(1991a, 1991c and 1992a). They are the result of cutting estimated 
distributions of households by per capita income, previously 
adjusted for income underestimation3, by means of country-specific 
poverty lines representing minimum normative budgets of private 
consumption based on minimum food budgets that adequately cover 
nutritional requirements4. The poverty lines used for different 
years of the 1980s were held constant in real terms, a criterion 
that is acceptable for a period of recession and recovery5. 
The present paper uses only headcount ratios as the poverty 
measure, which are available for several years of the past decade, 
for each country considered6. These are displayed in table 3, which 
also includes the incidence of extreme poverty or destitution, 
defined as the proportion of households with a per capita income 
less than the value of the minimum food budget. 
These estimates actually build up national measures of 
poverty from urban and rural estimates. However, it should be borne 
in mind that headcount estimates for the rural areas are of 
considerably shakier quality than those for the urban areas. On the 
one hand, the norms used to draw rural poverty lines have an 
unavoidable urban bias, in spite of taking into account price and 
consumption rural-urban differences. On the other hand, available 
measurements of rural incomes and of their distribution are usually 
even less accurate than those of urban incomes from the same 
3 For the method of adjustment applied, see Altimir (1987) and for the 
details of the adjustments, ECLAC (1991a). 
4 See ECLAC (1991a) for details on these country-specific minimum food 
budgets and how they were set. Minimum food baskets were drawn on the basis of 
the composition of food consumption of those strata of households that in each 
country attained with some latitude the minimum nutritional requirements, 
although such reference baskets were adjusted to those minimums as well as to 
mean national availability of each foodstuff and depurated of high-price-per-
calorie or nutritionally superfluous items. Therefore, the criterion to 
establish the minimum food baskets was one based on habits, taking into account 
availability and cost, rather than one of minimum-cost, taking into account 
availability and habits, used in Altimir (1979) for 1970. 
5 For a discussion of the case for shifting poverty lines over periods of 
economic growth, see Altimir (1991). 
6 ECLAC (1991a) also includes estimates of the poverty gaps, but only for 
1986. 
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survey. Finally, some of the rural estimates are no more than 
educated guesses based on relevant but indirect data7. 
The set of countries considered in this paper includes the major ones in the Latin American region as well as some others for which comparable inequality and poverty measurements are also available both at the beginning of the decade and at some later point of time. It excludes predominantly rural countries, like Guatemala and Honduras, for which poverty estimates were also produced by ECLAC, because the method of analysis used here and the variables on which it rests capture mainly urban phenomena, and the mere dimensions of rural poverty according to those estimates (affecting four fifths of the rural population and representing at least three fourths of all the poor) both underline the irrelevance of a urban-centered analysis and suggest that poverty measurement and analysis in such cases should be based on surveys, poverty yardsticks and explanatory variables more closely designed to rural conditions. 
Income in this data base generally measures household disposable cash8 income, including primary incomes (wages and salaries and entrepreneurial incomes) and other money incomes (pensions, transfers, rentals, interest„ etc.) after direct tax payments. It therefore excludes imputed income from public goods and services rendered free of charge or heavily subsidized and, hence, the redistributive effects of such public expenditure. These income measurements do not capture the incidence of indirect taxes on real incomes. 
b) The method of analysis. 
The above caveats should warn us not to confuse the map for the territory. Although our ultimate concern is with changes in social stratification and with disentangling those changes that are permanently reshaping Latin American societies from those related to peoples' transitory accommodations to hard times, we are able here to focus only on aggregate changes of the relative distribution of welfare and of the incidence of poverty, leaving out changes in the composition of households and in their economic strategies, including their ways of participating in the labour markets. 
7 See Altimir (1991). 
8 Incomes in kind and imputed incomes, such as receipts from family 
subsistence activities or rent of owner-occupied dwellings, are either explicitly 
excluded or so poorly measured as to be considered excluded in most of the 
surveys in the database, which are labour or income surveys. Only a minority of 
them are income and expenditure surveys, which may somehow measure such items 
(see Altimir, 1987). 
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Moreover, the analysis is limited to changes in the 
distribution of private income, excluding the distribution of 
social incomes (i.e., those accruing to households in the form of 
public goods or subsidies), thus focusing on the distributive 
results of peoples0 participation in the productive process and of 
their institutionalized entitlements. This focus leaves in the 
shadows the immediate redistributive consequences of social 
policies implemented through public expenditure -not so the results 
of entitlements to social security payments- but captures both the 
short-term effects of economic policy on the distribution of income 
and the more mediate and eventual influences of public policy on 
the structure of incomes, as mingled as they may be with structural 
changes quite beyond the influence of policy. 
With these limitations, I try to assess the distributive costs 
of the crisis and adjustments, which is more than "social costs" 
sometimes measured as losses in aggregate welfare, but is far less 
than total social costs, as long as we recognize that the social 
structure is more than the distribution of welfare and that living 
conditions are not only determined by income. 
Assesing the costs of what, is another matter. The 
distributive changes recorded by available income distribution 
measurements incorporate the effects of adjustment, institutional 
changes involving policy reform and underlying restructuring 
processes, as well as those of failed adjustment and the 
acceleration of inflation. However, since the crisis of the 1980s 
is the counterpart of an epochal transformation of Latin American 
development, measured distributive losses are attributable to those 
transformation processes, including the periods of instability and 
inflation, failed policies or policies involving overadjustment, 
that have marked such processes in some countries. 
The focus is not on the interaction of macroeconomic variables 
(which has been analysed elsewhere9), but on the relationships 
between changes of income distribution and poverty and processes of 
adjustment, policy reform and structural mutation underlying the 
changes of those macroeconomic variables. 
However, neither the depth nor the characteristics of 
productive restructuring is adequately revealed by changes in the 
set of mecroeconomic variables used, and their permanent 
distributive consequences can only hinted at by considering 
distributive situations after stabilization and adjustment. 
Likewise, the association of distributive changes with policy 
reforms is also explored in a broad way, given the methodological 
and time-related problems for linking both. 
9 See, for example, Bianchi, Devlin and Ramos (1985; 1987) and ECLAC (1986). 
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Even though the distributive costs of external adjustment, 
stabilization, fiscal adjustment and economic restructuring are 
intertwined, the characteristics and sequencing of policy packages 
certainly make a difference as to the magnitude and duration of 
distributive losses10. However, income distribution and poverty 
estimates in our database are too scanty for obtaining more than 
very broad hints in this regard. 
Moreover, in many instances the periods of analysis imposed by 
the availability of data include adjustment or stabilization 
policies followed by their failure and the acceleration of 
inflation, thus encompassing the distributive costs of both kinds 
of processes. 
The basic assessment criteria I use here are, on the one hand, 
to compare distributive changes and changes in macroeconomic and 
labour market variables during similar macroeconomic phases along 
the adjustment process in different countries and, on the other 
hand, to compare the distributive situations before and after 
adjustment in each country. 
Consequently, the analysis is carried out for different phases 
of the macroeconomic evolution of each economy during the 1980s, 
the underlying hypothesis being that different relationships 
between distributive changes and macroeconomic changes may hold 
during instability, recession, recovery and growth close to the 
production frontier. This stance, given the scarcity of 
distributional measurements for each country and the lack of 
uniformity as to their correspondence with similar macroeconomic 
phases, inhibits us from trying a formal econometric exercise» 
The selection of macroeconomic variables has taken into 
account both availability and analytical relevance. The implicit 
conceptual model links changes of inequality with those in the 
following: real national income per capita11, the real exchange 
rate as a proxy for relative prices, public consumption expenditure 
at constant prices12 as a proxy for government employment and real 
wages, inflation, real urban wages and urban labour 
underutilization (i.e., urban unemployment and informal 
employment). Changes in urban poverty are, in turn, related to 
10 See, for example, Garcia (1991). 
" i.e., per capita product after net factor payments and the effect of terms 
of trade variations; therefore, this variable incorporates the direct (i.e., 
accounting) effect of external shocks represented by changes in the terms of 
trade and in accrued interest on the foreign debt. 
12 That is, public consumption expenditure at current prices deflated by the 
GDP deflator, which is different from public consumption expenditure in real 
terms as estimated in national accounts, which in Latin American practice 
reflect, at best, government employment. 
7 
variations in real income per capita, inequality and the real 
minimum wage. Changes in rural poverty, on the other hand, are 
linked to changes of, real income per capita, agricultural product 
and the real exchange rate. 
There are a number of measurement limitations that hinder a 
rigorous association between observed changes in income 
distribution and poverty and observed changes in macroeconomic 
variables. Foremost among them is that observed income 
distributions from household surveys of the type generally used for 
these estimates (i.e., labour surveys) measure incomes in a 
specific month of the year, whereas measures for most of the 
relevant macroeconomic variables are made available on a yearly 
basis, with quarterly data being much more difficult to obtain. 
On the other hand, the years for which income distribution or 
poverty measurements are readily available do not always correspond 
to relevant phases of the conjunctural movements of the economy -
which, moreover, in many cases have been numerous and often of 
different direction- or to spells when a specific policy package 
was in force. 
The analysis of associations between distributive changes and 
macro variables focuses on the distribution of income and poverty 
in urban areas, with only a summary analysis of changes in rural 
poverty. There are various reasons for disaggregating the analysis. 
For one, as noted above, income distribution and poverty 
measurements at the national level incorporate or mix urban and 
rural measurements of very different degrees of reliability or 
accuracy, making the "constant bias over time88 assumption less 
tenable. But also most macro variables available have a different 
relationship with either urban or rural incomes (e.g., the exchange 
rate) or a tenuous or remote relationship with rural incomes (e.g., 
unemployment or informal employment), or almost no bearing at all 
on them in the short run (e.g., urban wages); hence, analysis based 
on aggregate income distribution or poverty at the national level 
blurs their differential explanatory value. 
Furthermore, for some countries or periods only measurements 
for urban areas are available. To be sure, this is a hindrance for 
distributional analysis. However, it is a less serious one than in 
other developing regions, since in most Latin American countries 
considered, more than 60% of the population is urban (being more 
than 80% in the Southern Cone countries and Venezuela) and less 
than half the poor are rural (20% or less in the Southern Cone and 
Venezuela). 
Finally, the distributive changes of the 1980s are assessed 
also in the context of the previous trends of the 1970s, before the 
crisis, when different growth processes were in place and -in some 
countries- policy reforms were undertaken. 
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3. The record of the 1970s. 
a) Inequality. 
The analysis of changes in income distribution and growth in the main countries of the region during the 1970s (Altimir, 1992) suggests, as summarized in table 1, the following: 
i) Countries which had very different degrees of income 
concentration at the beginning of the decade, but which experienced 
slow and unstable -or even disrupted- growth, like Argentina, Chile 
or Peru, suffered significant increases of inequality; 
ii) In countries with moderate average per capita growth rates 
(between 2% and 3%) over the decade and in which income 
concentration, at its beginning, was intermediate, like Costa Rica 
or Uruguay, inequality increased; 
iii) Three countries (Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) with 
solid average -and, therefore, sustained- per capita growth rates 
(over 3% a year) improved significantly their previously high (Gini 
over .5) income concentration; 
iv) On the contrary, the intense growth (close to 6% per 
capita a year) of Brazil during the 1970s was not accompanied by a 
reduction of the very high income concentration (Gini about .6) 
established during the previous decade. 
b) Poverty. 
Changes in the incidence of absolute poverty are dependent 
upon growth of average real income, changes in the distribution of 
income and also on the stance regarding the change of poverty norms 
over time13. Using comparable estimates of the incidence of poverty 
for 1970 and around 1980, with poverty lines both constant and 
shifting over time (Altimir, 1992), the following highlights (also 
summarized in table 1) emerge, for the sample of countries: 
i) Argentina, Chile and Peru, a group of countries with 
increasing inequality and low and unstable growth during the decade 
-as a consequence of economic shocks and institutional disruptions-
experienced either discouraging or outright dismal results on the 
poverty front. In Argentina the incidence of poverty at the 
national level may have increased slightly and in Peru even 
decreased, if the respective "educated guesses" about the decrease 
in rural poverty are accepted, but in both countries urban poverty 
Contrary to the widespread fashion of using poverty lines constant over 
time in real terms, there is a strong argument for shifting even absolute poverty 
lines over time, in a context of growth and societal progress (see Altimir, 
1991). 
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tended to increase. In Chile, the virtual explosion of poverty took 
place both in urban and rural areas. 
ii) In the two countries which experienced moderate growth and increasing inequality (Costa Rica and Uruguay), urban poverty either remained unchanged or increased, with rural poverty deceasing or about constant, respectively. 
iii) Those countries which attained high rates of per capita 
growth and decreasing inequality (Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) 
show significant reductions of absolute poverty, both in the urban 
and rural areas14. 
iv) Brazil's intense growth resulted in the reduction of 
poverty, even in spite of the lack of improvement of the relative 
income distribution; however, if some shifting of the poverty line 
is accepted, to allow for the eventual effects of such a growth 
process on the prevailing style of living, the incidence of poverty 
in urban areas would have roughly remained constant. 
v) The incidence of poverty in the rural areas showed a 
downward trend through he 1970s in almost all of the countries 
considered, irrespective of the rate or stability of their growth, 
with the only noticeable exception being Chile. 
vi) Rural-urban migrations, which were particularly intense in 
the 1970s, may have been more important than the improvement of 
economic conditions in the rural areas in explaining the absolute 
reduction of the rural poor in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. On 
the contrary, the last factor has been weightier than migrations in 
abating absolute rural poverty in Colombia, Mexico and Panama and 
the incidence of rural poverty in Costa Rica and Peru. In Chile, 
rural-urban migrations merely cushioned the rise of the incidence 
of poverty. 
4. Th« 1980s: a tale of ten countries., 
Income concentration and poverty increased in the urban areas 
of almost all Latin American countries during the 1980s, as is 
evident from tables 3 and 4. Colombia is the only unambiguous 
exception, while Mexico and Costa Rica appear to have somehow 
cushioned distributive deterioration caused by the adjustments of 
the decade, and Panama suffered only when disrupted by political 
and international conflict. Highly unequal Brazil has also 
undergone relatively less additional deterioration. Chile, 
Argentina and Uruguay experienced severe distributive losses, 
during different phases of their reform and adjustment processes of 
the last two decades, and their record of the 1980s has to be 
14 Even shifting poverty lines -because of high growth-, poverty would have 
been reduced, although to lesser degrees. 
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considered in this context. Peru and Venezuela also suffered heavy 
distributive losses, from different combinations of shocks and 
policy failures. Changes in income concentration15 and urban 
poverty in each country and period are compared with changes in 
relevant macroeconomic and labour market variables in annexed table 
A1 and summarized in table 5. 
The exceptional case is Colombia, where all available data 
show improvement of income distribution during the decade; between 
1978 and 1988, a relatively slight reduction of income 
concentration among earners (Londono, 1990); between 1980 and 1986, 
a significant decrease in the share of the upper decile of 
households, mainly in favour of the middle strata; moreover, up to 
1990, that improvement deepened, favouring also the lower four 
deciles of households. However, the incidence of urban poverty in 
1990 was roughly similar (around 35%) to the 1980 and 1986 marks. 
These results are roughly consistent with the initial 
conditions before the crisis, the macroeconomic trends of the 
period and the traditionally prudent style of Colombian economic 
policy. When the systemic financial crisis of the 1980s broke, 
Colombia was not heavily indebted; adjustment did not take place 
until 1984-1985 and then policy managed it gradually and 
deliberately with the aim of at minimizing wage and employment 
losses. In fact, during the rest of the decade economic policy 
included job creation and sustaining wages among its objectives 
(Garcia, 1991). 
In 1986, the country's comparatively mild external adjustment 
had just been completed, real income per capita was already 5% 
higher than in 1980 and real wages were 12% higher. However, urban 
unemployment was 4 points (i.e., almost a half) higher than in 1980 
and 2% more of the urban labour force (i.e., 27% of it) was 
employed in informal activities. The 1986-1990 period has been one 
of growth with stability, of sorts, for the Colombian economy, with 
the macroeconomic situation deteriorating somewhat in 1990. Real 
income per capita expanded more than 4% over the period, with 
exports, public consumption expenditure and private consumption 
leading the expansion. Unemployment correspondingly decreased (by 
Even reliable income distribution measurements are not able to 
capture income of the country's residents accrued on assets abroad. Capital 
flight during the initial years of the crisis has been substantial, particularly 
in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela (See Cumby and Levich, 1987). With yields 
current at the time, property income on assets accumulated abroad by the private 
sector of those countries may have represented around 3% of household disposable 
income in Argentina and Mexico and as much as 5% in Venezuela. These proportions 
have most likely increased the share of the upper decile or quintile on total 
household income, adding to the changes recorded in Table 4 for the first half 
of the decade. Similarly, the later fall of the international interest rate and 
related yields should have represented an inverse change (of about half the 
previous one) of the "total" (i.e., from domestic and foreign sources) share of 
the upper-income groups. 
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more than 3 points) as did the importance of informal employment, 
but real wages increased slightly up to 1989 and decreased 
significantly only in 1990. 
In available measurements show a significant decrease 
in inequality, accompanied by a reduction of poverty at the 
national level, between 1977 and 1984, and a subsequent 
deterioration between 1984 and 1989, a period during which the 
Government" s policy stance radically changed16,, The 1984 
observation falls in the midst of the first programme of adjustment 
and stabilization, at a time when a moderate economic recovery from 
recessionary adjustment was taking place (Lustig, 1992)„ However, 
the real wage had dropped almost 30% in two years, and per capita 
public consumption expenditure had decreased 14%. It is likely that 
the improvement in concentration with respect to 1977 —beyond the 
ever-present possibility that the two measurements are not 
comparable- conceal a deterioration from a substantially better 
distributive situation reached during the period of vigorous growth 
(6% a year) prior to the crisis, particularly in the urban areas. 
Be that as it may, there is evidence of an increase in 
inequality between 1984 and 1989, when the Mexican economy was 
recovering to a moderate rate of growth with inflation under 
control, after absorbing an oil shock (real national income per 
capita was still 7% lower than in 1984) , and in a period when 
fiscal discipline and policy reforms were progressively gaining 
ground. Over this span, per capita public consumption expenditure 
was reduced more than 30% in real terms and urban real wages 
declined a further 26%. At the same time, unemployment dropped to 
levels below those during the oil boom and informal employment 
increased 10 points, to more than 30% of the non-agricultural 
labour force. Both developments, consistent with the remarkable 
flexibility of real wages, must have cushioned the impact on the 
incomes of poor and lower-middle households (Lustig, 1992). 
(Sosfea Riea has been traditionally characterized by political 
and economic stability and the adjustment of its economy during the 
1980s was significantly aided by official transfers from the United 
States. Nevertheless, the distribution of urban incomes worsened 
between the beginning and the end of the decade, although the 
improvement of rural incomes may have helped to preserve the 
previous concentration of income at the national level17. The 
deterioration that took place between 1981 and 1988 was only 
16 On this regard, see Lustig (1992). 
17 Morley and Alvarez (1992) argue that the real devaluation that was 
required for external adjustment presumably increased agricultural wages after 
1981, although the bulk of the devaluation occurred in that year. They also 
verify that between 1981 and 1989 rural nominal incomes in the lower deciles of 
the national distribution increased more than those of urban households in the 
same deciles (cf. tables 7b and 7c). 
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partially reversed during the following biennium, the reversal 
having favored the middle strata more than the poor. Consequently, 
urban poverty increased significantly between 1981 and 1988, and 
advanced somewhat further up to 1990. 
During the recessionary external adjustment of 1981-1982, 
there is evidence that impoverishment was acute, while later 
stabilization and recovery in 1983-1986 brought about a decrease in 
absolute poverty, to levels of incidence close to those prior to 
the crisis (Trejos, 1991). At least, this appears to have happened 
at the national level; real devaluation may have increased the 
incomes of the rural poor, as argued by Morley and Alvarez (1992), 
and the real rise —after the adjustment— of wages in formal 
activities may have improved the situation of the lower-middle 
strata. On the other hand, the deterioration of real incomes in 
informal activities -which had expanded- may have increased the 
number of the urban poor18. 
In the later period, marked by policy reform (specially trade 
liberalization) and unstable expansion, available evidence 
indicates a relative stabilization of poverty incidence at the 
national level19, but also -as already indicated- a tendency for 
urban poverty to increase, in the context of a reduction of the 
real wage, the sliding of real income per capita and a relative 
real constancy of the exchange rate. On the other hand, expansion 
of public consumption expenditure in real terms (20% per capita) 
must have helped the observed improvement of the relative position 
of middle income groups. 
The external shocks that ignited the crisis in other Latin 
American countries had a lagged and milder impact on the economy of 
Panama, which only suffered a brief stagnation of economic activity 
in 1983/84. In spite of a 23% rise of real income per capita and a 
14% increase of real wages, between 1979 and 1986 urban poverty 
fell only slightly, to less than 30% of households. The political 
crisis cum international conflict that pushed the Panamanian 
economy into recession in 1988-1989, brought real income per capita 
to 5% below the 1979 level -although this was not so with real 
wages-, reduced per capita public consumption expenditures more 
than 20% and widened open unemployment 10 percentage points of the 
urban labour force. With this, the concentration of income 
significantly increased, as did poverty, to 34% of urban 
households. 
18 Morley and Alvarez (1992) indicate a sharp deterioration of nominal wages 
in non-basic services relative to industry, among urban households, between 1981 
and 1986 (see their table 7h). 
19 See Trejos (1991) and ECLAC (1992a). 
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The already highly unequal income distribution of ©sasal, 
which had not improved during the previous decade of high growth, 
worsened further during the 1980s, The inequality of the 
distribution of household income remained relatively stable during 
the 1981-1983 recession and later recovery, having improved 
slightly and briefly in 1986, in the milieu of growth and temporary 
stability created by the Cruz ado Plain. On the contrary, between 
that year and 1989, with the acceleration of inflation and the 
beginning of the present recession, income concentration increased. 
However, there is evidence (Hoffmman, 1992) that in 1990 inequality 
of household income decreased somewhat. 
Consequently, the distribution of income in 1989 was more 
concentrated than in 1979, and poverty affected 5% more of urban 
households, while real national income per capita and industrial 
wages were at about the same level as at the end of the previous 
decade, but unemployment had risen by more than 3 percentage 
points, as did also informal employment. On the other hand, 
expansion of public consumption expenditure (55% per capita, 
between 1979 and 1989) must have helped to cushion the relative 
deterioration of middle income groups. The fall of economic 
activity and incomes in 1990, which was accompanied by a 20% real 
reduction of industrial wages, increased urban poverty by 4 
additional points, to almost 39% of households. 
External shocks and policy reforms under the authoritarian 
rule of the Pinochet regime, along with ensuing instability and low 
average growth, caused major changes in income distribution and 
poverty in eisil®, during both the 1970s and the 1980s. Income 
distribution suffered a significant deterioration,0 not only was the 
short-lived redistribution that lasted up to 1974 reversed, but the 
distributive pattern in Chilean society underwent a metamorphosis. 
By 1980, after the recovery from a deep recession (per capita 
GDP was only 6% higher than in 1970), the implementation of a 
radical trade liberalization programme, the reversal of agrarian 
reform, and institutional reforms that allowed for greater labour 
market flexibility but also for labour repression (Ffrench-Davis 
and Raczynski, 1987), the upper decile of households was receiving 
at least five points more of total income than in 1968, to the 
detriment of the shares -and real incomes- of both the middle and 
lower strata. Real wages were still more than 10% lower than in 
1970, 17% of the labour force was unemployed and 28% was in 
informal activities. Absolute poverty virtually exploded, both in 
the urban areas -from 12% in 1970 to around 28% in 1980- and in the 
rural areas, bringing the incidence of poverty at the national 
level to about 30% of the households (Altimir, 1991). 
During the 1982- 1983 crisis, existing inequality was further 
aggravated -although perhaps marginally, with respect to the 
increase of the previous period- and urban poverty increased even 
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more20. Deterioration may have continued until 1987, when real 
income per capita and real wages were respectively still 12% and 5% 
lower than in 1980, per capita public consumption expenditure had 
shrunk more than 30% and unemployment still affected 17% of the 
labour force, even while the share of informal activities had been 
reduced. Under those circumstances, urban poverty had risen by 
about 4 points (14% on a per capita basis) and the distribution of 
income had been further concentrated in favour of the upper 
quintile, whose share of expenditure increased by almost 4% of the 
total with respect to 1978, to the detriment of those of the middle 
and lower strata, the latter having suffered a relatively greater 
loss. 
Only between 1987 and 1990, with the Chilean economy reaching 
full capacity utilization and progressive reforms of the labour 
laws, did the distributive picture improve somewhat. Real per 
capita income increased 18%, real wages rose 11% and unemployment 
was reduced by almost 6 points, to about 7% of the labour force. 
Notwithstanding this performance, urban income concentration 
decreased slightly, in favour of the lower income groups, and urban 
poverty was reduced by 2 points; rural poverty decreased more 
significantly, bringing the incidence of poverty at the national 
level to less than 35% of households. 
Major distributive changes have also taken place in Argentina 
since the 1970s, under successive spells of economic instability 
and political disruption. After the advent of a military regime in 
1976, policy reforms were introduced to liberalize prices, trade 
and the financial market, but not employment and wages (which were 
repressed for most of the period). Economic activity followed a 
stop-go pattern in the context of a high-inflation regime, in spite 
of the overriding anti-inflationary policy stance which permeated 
three successive programmes (Canitrot, 1981). 
Between 1970 and 1980 income concentration significantly 
increased: the upper decile of households enlarged its share of 
total income by almost 5 points, while the lower strata lost almost 
3 points. Urban poverty increased by 2 points, to 7%. Most of this 
deterioration, however, took place after 197421. In 1980, real 
income per capita was roughly similar and real wages in 
manufacturing were still 14% lower than in 1974, while unemployment 
was very low. 
20 Pollack and Uthoff (1987) estimate a 8 percentage points (from 40% to 48%) 
increase of absolute poverty in the Greater Santiago. 
21 See Altimir (1986) for the evolution of income distribution and Beccaria 
and Minujin (1991), for the evolution of absolute poverty during the period. 
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The sizeable fluctuations in economic activity, the magnitude 
of the external shocks and ensuing adjustments and swings in 
relative prices, associated with high and accelerating inflation 
during the 1980s, were accompanied by movements of the relative 
distribution of income, although perhaps not as intense as 
macroeconomic ebb and flow (Beccaria, 1991). By 1986, income 
concentration had further increased with respect to 1980, involving 
a dramatic change from the beginning of the 1970s; the share of the 
upper decile had been enhanced about as much as it had in the 
previous decade, but this time at the expense mainly of the middle-
level strata* Urban poverty had increased 6 points (i.e., almost 
double), to more than 12% of households. Although the economy was 
recovering under a successful stabilization programme, real per 
capita income was 22% below the 1980 level, unemployment was 3 
points higher and informal employment 2 points higher," on the other 
hand, the real wage was 6% higher than at the beginning of the 
decade. 
After 1986, the acceleration of inflation and the fall in real 
wages were accompanied by a further deterioration of the relative 
income distribution, which culminated in 1989; with the burst of 
hyperinflation and recession reaching its trough, concentration 
stood at its peak. In 1990, income concentration among individual 
recipients receded to the still high level reached in 1988 
(Beccaria, 1991). Between 1986 and 1990, poverty may have involved 
an additional 6% of urban households (an increase of more than 50% 
on a per capita basis) and improved only in 1991, when prices 
stabilized and economic recovery began. 
©rugaaay is the other Southern Cone country in which policy 
reforms were already undertaken in the 1970s, under authoritarian 
rule, with significant distributive consequences. Starting in 1974, 
the financial market was liberalized and price controls were 
gradually eliminated, while wages continued to be administered; 
since 1979, a trade liberalization programme was put into effect. 
The 1973-1981 period was one of relatively high growth (3.4% per 
capita a year); nevertheless, the distribution of income 
deteriorated sharply between 1973 and 1979 -at the expense of both 
the middle and lower strata- improving somewhat later, only to the 
benefit of the middle income strata. This evolution closely 
followed that of the relationship between real national income per 
capita and real wages; the former increased 12% between 1973 and 
1979, while the latter dropped 32%; between 1979 and 1981, real 
income expanded 4% but real wages rose about 17%. On the other 
hand, urban poverty increased by 4 percentage points (40% on a per 
capita basis) between 1970 and 1981. 
External shocks and ensuing adjustments slashed real per 
capita income by 19% between 1981 and 1986; the real wage fell 8% 
and unemployment increased 4 points, while per capita public 
consumption expenditure was reduced more than 30%. Income 
concentration increased again, and urban poverty expanded by 5 
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additional percentage points, to 14% of households. As a result of 
economic recovery and later stagflation, real per capita income in 
1989 was 13% higher than in 1986 and the real wage was 6% higher, 
while unemployment had decreased 2 percentage points. Consequently, 
the distribution of urban incomes improved and urban poverty 
decreased by 4 percentage points. Thus, at the end of the decade, 
the relative distribution of income and the incidence of absolute 
poverty were roughly similar to those at its outset, while real 
wages were substantially lower and unemployment somewhat higher 
than in 1981. 
Continuing deterioration of real national income in Venezuela 
between 1980 and 1986, caused by the fall of oil revenues, and 
ensuing reduction (around 20%) of real wages and per capita public 
consumption expenditure were accompanied by a significant worsening 
of the distributive situation. Between 1981 and 1986 urban poverty 
increased 7 percentage points (almost 40% on a per capita basis) 
while the relative distribution of income also became more unequal. 
Economic policy failed to adjust to the fall of oil prices in 
1986; external and fiscal imbalances widened and the rate of 
inflation tripled. The orthodox stabilization programme implemented 
at the beginning of 1989, along with the first trade and price 
liberalization measures of a programme of policy reform, brought a 
recession and sharp falls of public consumption expenditure and 
real wages, while previous gains in employment were reversed and 
informal activities expanded. Consequently, poverty increased22 and 
income distribution apparently "equalized downwards". The rise in 
oil earnings caused by the conflict of the Gulf in 1990, and 
ensuing public expenditure in 1991, fueled an extraordinary -and 
unsustainable- expansion of economic activity. This, however, was 
mainly to the advantage of the upper-middle strata; urban poverty 
in 1990 was still 9 percentage points higher than in 1986 and 16 
points (i.e., almost double) than that of 1981. On the other hand, 
there is evidence indicating that by 1991, poverty -at least at the 
national level- may have receded somewhat . 
The worsening income distribution in the urban areas of Peru 
in the 1970s was aggravated during the 1982-1985 crisis and 
external adjustment, in a context of increasing violence. By the 
end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986, when the economy was 
recovering under the drive of an unsustainable heterodox 
stabilization programme implemented by the newly elected Garcia's 
government, real national income per capita and real wages in the 
22 Marquez (1992) estimates poverty at the national level at 28% of 
households in 1985, 32% in 1987 and 41% in 1989. 
23 Marquez (1992) puts poverty incidence at the national level at 35% of 
households, compared with 41% in 1989, a point where it was no doubt higher than 
in 1990. 
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private sector were still 9% and 5% lower than in 1979, whereas an 
additional 10% of the non-agricultural labour force was employed in 
informal activities (reaching more than 40%). At the time, urban 
poverty still affected 45% of urban households, 10 percentage 
points more than in 1979. 
Although there are no comparable observations for later years, 
there is some evidence that by 1990, in the midst of hyperinflation 
and economic collapse, poverty may have expanded by more than half 
with respect to 1985=1986, worsening even further in 1991, when 
Fujimori's government put in place the present stabilization 
programme24 . 
So S u r a l p e w E t f o 
For most of the countries in our sample there is evidence of 
a decrease -however slight, in some cases- in the incidence of 
rural poverty through the 1980s, thus somehow at least inertially 
continuing the trend towards abatement of rural poverty that was 
manifest in the previous decade. The only clear exceptions are 
Panama and Venezuela, where that trend appears to have reversed 
itself by the end of the 1980s, and possibly Argentina, for which 
a slight increase in rural poverty has been estimated. Chile is a 
special case, where the rural impoverishment of the 1970s continued 
well into the following decade, only to be reversed in the latter 
years (see table 3). 
Those exceptional increases are associated with falls in real 
per capita income, but the reverse does not hold: of nine recorded 
spells of rural poverty reduction, in only four25 real national 
income per capita increased, in the remaining five, rural poverty 
decreased along with real national income falls. On the contrary, 
there is a close association of rural poverty reduction with 
expanding agricultural output, which holds in eight of the nine 
spells, suggesting that peasants somehow share general rural 
prosperity. However, going against conventional wisdom26, the 
association is weaker with real devaluation of the exchange rate, 
24 See Figueroa (1992), table 2 and Abugattas and Lee (1991), table 4. On the 
other hand, the comparison of the distributions of Lima households by size of per 
capita consumption expenditure, from the 1985-1986 and 1990 LSMS surveys 
(Psacharopoulos and others 1992), shows little increase of inequality between the 
two observations; this may reflect another case of "downward equalization" by 
recession, with the real consumption of the poor falling by almost 7% a year and 
the real consumption of the richer decile by almost 6% a year. 
25 Brazil 1979-87, Colombia 1980-86, Chile, 1987-90 and Panama 1979-86. 
26 At least, without allowing for time lags between real devaluation, 
reallocation of resources to tradables, ensuing expansion of agricultural output 
and eventual participation of peasants and laborers in such expansion. 
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since it is observed only in four of the cases, and in most of them with low parameters (see table 6). 
All this suggests that, in the absence of major institutional reform27, slow-moving structural changes in the rural milieu affect the process of reduction of rural poverty more than short-or even medium-term changes in macroeconomic variables, although these may be able to slow down or even temporarily reverse such process. 
Those slow-moving changes are in part reflected in the continuous transfer of rural poverty to the urban areas through migrations. In the 1980s, these were less intense than in the previous decade, but anyway they were substantial. In most of the 
countriesj, rural-urban migrations were the main force sustaining the Trend/Towards the reduction of poverty in rural areas, although they may not have been sufficient -as they had been in the 1970s-to prevent the absolute increase in the rural poor. 
6. Transient and permanent changes of income distribution. 
In order to shed some light on whether and to what extent changes of inequality during the decade of crisis and adjustments may be permanent, it is crucial to consider the different macroeconomic phases through which Latin American countries have passed and which are the structural circumstances in which each of them is at present, as well as the nature and depth of policy reforms undertaken. Changes of macroeconomic and labour variables and distributive changes in selected periods corresponding to different macroeconomic phases of the 1980s are summarized in table 5.28 
a) Income distribution and poverty in different phases of 
adjustment processes. 
i) Recessive adjustment to external shocks at the beginning of 
the decade has had adverse effects in terms of inequality and 
devastating effects on urban poverty across Latin America. Income 
concentration certainly increased in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and 
Venezuela and perhaps also in Costa Rica and Mexico, while in 
Brazil inequality apparently remained invariant through the rapid 
adjustment of 1981-198429. In all these cases urban poverty 
27 Such as agrarian reform, as in Peru, or its reversal, as in Chile, both 
in the 1970s. 
28 The macroeconomic phases corresponding to the periods selected 
according to the availability of comparable income distribution or poverty 
measurements are included in table 3 and 4, and the changes of macroeconomic and 
labour variables recorded over those periods are indicated in annexed table A.l, 
as well as the policy reforms carried out in each period. 
29 See Hoffmann (1992). 
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increased during adjustment, along with underutilization of the 
urban labour force30 (which rose beti^een 10% and 20%, depending on 
the country) and with sizeable falls of per capita real income, 
real average wages31 and real per capita public consumption 
expenditure„ 
Colombia stands out as an exception, in part due to its lesser 
initial debt burden. The economy went through a smooth external 
adjustment -even with real currency appreciation- and reduction of 
inflation, which allowed for real rises of minimum and average 
wages, and even for the real expansion of per capita consumption 
expenditure. Such was the background for a likely improvement of 
income distribution and the lack of aggravation of absolute 
poverty. Although Panama also underwent a mild adjustment in 1982-
1984, with rising real wages but an increase of unemployment, in 
this case we do not have a clue about the distributive changes over 
that period. 
ii) aftss- ®szt®rmal aeljMgfcwsmt only in some countries 
brought relief on the poverty front. In Brazil, it can be 
associated with the cumulative rise of real per capita income 
(close to 20%) and real wages (37%), and with decreasing labour 
underutilization, in spite of a probable increase of inequality32. 
If Peru also experienced a slackening of urban poverty during this 
phase -which is not really known, but just plausible- it may have 
been due to a similar configuration of changes in the level of 
activity and the labour market. The decrease in poverty in Uruguay 
-along with inequality- and perhaps in Costa Rica and Panama, and 
the possible maintenance of its -already reduced- incidence in 
Colombia, are also associated with changes of income and the labour 
variables in the same sense, although less spectacular in 
magnitude33. 
30 The indicator of underutilization of the urban labour force used here is 
the sum of the rate of open (urban) unemployment and the proportion of the non-
agricultural labour force in informal activities, estimated by PREALC. 
31 In Argentina, however, the real wage recovered and the minimum wage jumped 
in 1983, at the end of the disintegrating military regime, even with accelerating 
inflation. In Chile, the real average wage (in formal activities) rose up to 
1982, in the context of moderate inflation, high labour underutilization (almost 
half of the non-agricultural labour force) and a new labour regime that granted 
total flexibility in the labour market (Garcia, 1991). 
32 However, the conspicuous increase of real per capita public consumption 
expenditure (42%) must have improved the relative position of some middle income 
strata. 
33 Mexico's brief and mild recovery in 1984 did not significantly alter the 
results of the previous recessive phase, although "the very circumstances that 
triggered (it) contributed in part to its demise" along with worsening the terms 
of trade in 1985 (Lustig, 1992; pp.34-36). 
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On the contrary, recovery in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela was accompanied by further increases in urban poverty, although for different reasons. In Argentina, the unsteady and only partial recovery and the increase in unemployment and informal labour apparently outweighed the modest rise in the real wage and the temporary abatement of inflation. Also in Venezuela, until 1989, the recovery had been partial and subject to adverse external shocks, with accelerating inflation; on the other hand, shrinking (-38%) real wages and per capita consumption expenditure (-20%, in real terms) prevailed over a very modest decrease of labour underut i1i zat ion; such was the setting in which increases of inequality and of urban poverty occurred. In the case of Chile, complete labour market flexibility allowed for equity deterioration in the medium run; the 1983-1987 recovery was vigorous and underutilization of the labour force decreased significantly -although it still remained above a third of the urban labour force-but the real wage and per capita public consumption expenditure barely hold, in a context of moderate and roughly constant inflation; both inequality and absolute poverty increased. 
iii) Those countries which again plunged into recession» a£t©r recovering from external adjustment, due to pervasive internal imbalances, additional external shocks and accelerating inflation cum stabilization efforts, experienced even further increases in inequality and absolute poverty. 
In Argentina and Peru such imbalances drove the economies to hyperinflation, and in Brazil to the brink of it; real incomes and wages plunged and labour underutilization increased, as also did absolute poverty and income inequality. Getting out of hyperinflation in Argentina in 1990 stopped the fall and even brought some marginal improvement of inequality, although it did not prevent a further increase in poverty. The acceleration of inflation in Brazil took place along with some economic expansion and further increases in per capita public consumption expenditure, although with stagnated real per capita income and falling real wages; however, the 1990 stabilization package brought about disinflation with recession, which apparently increased poverty further. 
External shocks in 1985-1986 and stabilization efforts in Mexico also determined a new recessionary spell; the increase in informality and the drop in real wages suggest the possibility of a further enhancement of urban poverty and -jointly with the fall in per capita public consumption expenditure- also that part of the observed increase in inequality up to 1989 may have taken place during this period. Panama's deep recession of 1988-89, triggered by political and international conflict, increased urban poverty and possibly also inequality. 
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iv) The two cases of sfeaSsiligatiem aa<S from high 
inflation and recession in the late 1980s (Argentina in 1990=1991 
and Mexico in 1987=1989) included moderate increases in real income 
and in the utilization of the urban labour force and also moderate 
reductions in real wages. In the case of Argentina, urban poverty 
decreased from the high level of incidence attained during the 
previous spells. In the case of Mexico, there is no evidence of a 
similar abatement of poverty or of a decrease of inequality. 
v) In almost all of the few observable instances of sustained 
or even unsustainable geewfela aftms such circumstances 
brought about an improvement in the relative income distribution 
and some decrease in urban poverty. Only in Costa Rica in 1990 did 
urban poverty rise, with the acceleration of inflation and 
particularly the elimination of subsidies and the increase in 
public services rates. In Both Colombia and Chile inequality and 
poverty decreased; in the later case the rises of real incomes and 
wages were more substantial, but in Colombia real per capita public 
consumption expenditure expanded. In Venezuela, there are 
indications of a reduction of income concentration in 1989-90, in 
spite of falling real wages and increasing unemployment. 
b) Policy, reforms and income distribution. 
Economic policy reforms generally oriented to facilitate or 
promote sustainable growth on the basis of freer trade and private 
investment may have a share of the short-term effects on income 
distribution of the package of stabilization and adjustment 
policies though which they have been implemented. Moreover, some of 
these effects may have been imposed by the political economy of 
reforms for them to take root. In the longer term, the consequences 
of reform can have negative distributive effects if a trade-off 
between growth and a more equitable distribution of income is 
observed, or is expected on the basis of the pattern of growth 
promoted by the particular reforms undertaken. 
Moreover, while presently there is a blueprint for market-
oriented reforms, broadly reflected in the World Economic Report 
1991 (The World Bank, 1991), which has a pervasive influence, there 
is not in fact a common "model" of policy reform being applied by 
all countries of the region. While all pursue goals of 
macroeconomic stability and international competitiveness, they 
have shown wide differences in their strategies of reform, in terms 
of the institutional content and the style of State intervention 
involved as well as the mix and sequencing of particular reforms. 
Policy reforms carried out in Southern Cone countries in the 
1970s, in combination with stabilization programs34, coincided with 
increases in income concentration and aggravation of urban poverty 
34 For a comparative analysis of those reforms, see Corbo and de Melo (1987). 
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(see table 5). However, their longer term associations with growth 
and income distribution are blurred by the ensuing crisis and the 
course of adjustment in each case. 
In Argentina, trade and financial liberalization reforms were 
reversed or suspended at the beginning of the crisis (Canitrot, 
1993). The complex later story of instability with recurring 
efforts to adjust the economy and stabilize prices includes the 
continuing deterioration of distributive equity, underlined above. 
A new programme of stabilization and policy reform was just put in 
place in 1989 and consolidated in 1991. 
In Chile, reforms were resilient enough to be maintained, with 
only a partial reversal of trade liberalization during the 1903= 
1984 crisis (Meller, 1992) , and a second wave of reforms took place 
after 1984. The structural effects of the sweeping policy reforms 
undertaken in this country are manifold, but they can fairly be 
summarized as having eventually resulted in a stable and growing 
outward-oriented economy with substantially greater income 
inequality. 
In Uruguay, financial liberalization in 1974-1979 was 
consolidated and supplemented by trade liberalization in 1979-1981. 
Over the medium term, those reforms appear to have facilitated 
growth under a regime of "controlled instability", while income 
distribution has tended to regain its previous (relatively) low 
concentration pattern. 
In 1985, after a shock stabilization policy, Costa Rica 
started its gradual programme of structural reforms, along with 
measures to reduce its social costs. These appear to have been 
mainly transient, as far as relative income distribution is 
concerned, now that the economy is back on a medium-term growth 
path to recover the pre-crisis level of per capita income. 
In 1987, after renegotiating its external debt, Mexico stepped 
up its gradual policy reform strategy, enhancing trade and 
financial liberalization, along with fiscal reform. Up to 1989, 
inequality had contemporaneously increased, as already noted, 
although apparently not to a degree much greater than that existing 
in the late 1970s. 
Market-oriented policy reforms were launched much more 
recently in the other countries: in 1989 in Argentina and Venezuela 
and in 1990 in Colombia and Peru. That circumstance hinders any 
assessment of their association with changes in income 
concentration, beyond those related to the macroeconomic evolution 
of each economy during the period. 
Full empirical verification of whether the economic 
restructuring promoted by these policy reforms and by the new 
structural circumstances involves a more unequal distribution of 
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income will have to wait for the long term deployment of their 
effects. For the moment, we can only consider what appear to be the 88normal00 or more or less 00 stable88 distributive structures once each 
economy regains a sustained growth path. 
c) Permanent changes in income concentration. 
Consider first the countries that have already attained a 
stage of full-capacity growth. Colombia is the only one in which 
income concentration at that stage is lower than before the crisis. 
On the other hand, in Costa Rica in 1990 urban inequality was only 
slightly higher than in 1981. In both countries, the real wage and 
per capita public consumption expenditure were higher than at the 
beginning of the decade (see table 7). 
On the contrary, in Chile, after regaining a medium-term 
growth path, the structure of incomes is significantly more 
concentrated than prior to the crisis and certainly much more than 
the relative income distribution prevalent at the end of the 1960s, 
before the socialist-populist experiment and the authoritarian 
structural reforms of the 1970s (see table 4) . This is true in 
spite of an almost recovered real wage. Also, in Venezuela, income 
concentration is higher than before the crisis, after recovery 
evolved into rapid albeit unsustainable growth; in this case, both 
real wages and per capita public consumption are substantially 
lower than before the crisis. 
Although not yet on a full-capacity growth path in 1989, 
Mexico and Uruguay were approaching the culmination of their 
respective recoveries; at that stage, income inequality had nearly 
returned in both cases to pre-recession levels35. In Mexico, this 
was in spite of drastic reductions in real wages and public 
consumption expenditure, while in Uruguay both variables were more 
moderately eroded. 
The countries that were still labouring under recession and 
instability (Argentina, Brazil, Panama and Peru) at the end of the 
1980s showed degrees of inequality substantially higher than those 
prevailing before the crisis. Stabilization and recovery in 
Argentina brought only a slight improvement of income inequality, 
which still remained at a high degree relative to the pre-crisis 
level, which was substantially higher than the one prevalent before 
the disruptions of the 1970s. On the other hand, in the spells of 
recovery after external adjustment, income distribution 
improvements —where they existed— took place only along with real 
wage increases, as outlined above; these are less likely to occur 
35 However, if pre-recession (ca. 1981) inequality in Mexico was even lower 
than the degree observed in 1977, as suggested earlier, post-recovery inequality 
would have been somewhat higher than that previous mark. 
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during the stabilization processes still to be faced by Brazil and 
Peru, and did not occur during the current Panamanian recovery. 
Therefore, one should not expect significant equity 
improvements in these countries as a consequence of stabilization 
and recovery. Even more, full deployment of policy reforms and 
associated adjustment measures —particularly on the fiscal front-
may still bring some medium-term enhancement of income inequality. 
Furthermore, if the experiences of Colombia and Chile are taken as 
exemplary, all these countries can expect a modest attenuation of 
income inequalities only later, when they attain a sustained growth 
path. 
In sum,, "'normal6' distributive patterns in the coming phase of 
sustained growth, when it materializes in most Latin American 
countries, once these countries have recovered from the crisis and 
its sequels, completed structural adjustments and deployed policy 
reforms, tend to be more unequal —at least in the urban areas— than 
those prevailing in the last stages of the previous growth phase, 
during the 1970s. 
Only Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay —and, just possibly, 
Mexico— have managed to restore their previous degrees of 
inequality (see table 7). It is hardly by chance that such a thing 
happened in countries in which social justice values have 
traditionally impregnated institutions, equity objectives have been 
rather consistently incorporated in policy design throughout the 
adjustment phase and both adjustment and policy reforms have been 
approached gradually and pragmatically36. This suggests that the 
tendencies that increase inequality of primary earnings (before the 
eventual corrections involved in public social spending) can be 
positively corrected by economic policy design and implementation. 
7. Prospects for poverty alleviation. 
Even with no significant changes in the relative distribution 
of income37, absolute poverty will be reduced by economic growth; 
more quickly -at least in economists8 estimates- if constant 
poverty lines are used, or more parsimoniously if shifting poverty 
yardsticks are deemed normatively more appropriate. 
36 The gradual approach has been abandoned in Mexico in the last phase of the 
reform process, but then this process came under the incorporation of the country 
into NAFTA, a strategic jump that, when completed, will radically change the 
structural conditions of the Mexican economy and, among them, its distributive 
structures. 
37 Including, to be sure, no changes either of the composition of households 
or of their work and resource utilization strategies, which is a highly 
artificial assumption. 
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The record of the 1970s, outlined earlier, shows urban poverty 
decreasing only in rapidly growing economies, which either 
maintained or reduced the concentration of their household income. 
In Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, where equity improved, the 
reduction of urban poverty showed elasticities of -.5 to -1 with 
respect to the increase in real per capita income and of =.4 to -2 
with respect to real wages. In Brazil, with no significant 
improvement of income concentration, such elasticities were much 
lower (see table 8). 
Recession and recovery in the 1980s left most Latin American 
countries with a -sometimes gapingly- higher incidence of poverty 
in urban areas than before the crisis. Only Colombia and possibly 
Mexico were able to end their respective recovery phases with less 
urban poverty than before the recession, in both cases because of 
a decrease of inequality (see table 7). 
Available poverty estimates seldom allow for sharply 
differentiating recessive spells from recovery spells. When it 
does, the beneficial effects of recovery on poverty appear weaker 
than the negative effects of the previous recession. In Uruguay, 
the elasticity of poverty with respect to real income in the 1986= 
1989 recovery was -2, while during the recession it had been =3. In 
Argentina, disinflation earn recovery abated poverty as elastically 
(=4) as recession had increased it, but recovery itself was then 
very incipient. In Venezuela, on the other hand, the completion of 
recovery did not even prevent poverty from widening further. 
In other instances (Brazil 1979=1987, Costa Rica 1981=1988, 
Chile 1980=1987 and Peru, 1979=1986) the culmination of the 
recovery phase left the economy with a greater degree of inequality 
and a higher incidence of urban poverty. In Costa Rica, not even 
sustained growth after 1988 was able to prevent the increase in 
urban poverty, as a consequence of price deregulation (see table 
8). 
In most cases, real wages at the end of recovery were lower 
than prior to the crisis, which helps to explain the weaker effect 
of recovery on poverty. Although in Argentina and Brazil, at the 
culmination of the respective heterodox stabilization programmes, 
and in Costa Rica, real wages were higher, that fact alone appears 
to have been offset by other factors which increased inequality 
and, in the first case, particularly by the fall of real income per 
capita. On the contrary, in Colombia and Panama, higher real wages 
have reinforced the recovery of real income by preventing the 
eventual increase in urban poverty. Not so in Mexico, where the 
real wage in 1984 was substantially lower than before the crisis 
(see table 8). 
On the other hand, the few observable growth spells at the end 
of the 1980s show (Colombia 1986-1990 and Chile 1987-1990) similar 
elasticities with respect to real per capita income (-.7 and =.4, 
26 
respectively) than those recorded in the 1970s in rapidly growing 
economies where income inequality was decreasing. Only in Chile, 
however, has poverty reduction been more elastic with respect to 
real wages than to real incomes, as had happened in all cases in 
the 1970s (see table 8). 
Rural-urban migrations will continue to exert pressure on the 
ability of the economies to alleviate urban poverty. If the 
experience of the last two decades (Altimir, 1991) is any 
indication of what might happen, in the relatively less urbanized 
countries with high incidence of poverty in the rural areas, the 
migrating rural poor may augment the urban poor at a rate 
equivalent to 1.3-2.0% a year of absolute increase. 
Minding up all this evidence, it is likely, on the one hand, 
that countries accomplishing their recovery into full-capacity 
growth will change gear in their ability to reduce urban poverty in 
the short run, requiring relatively more expansion of economic 
activity than in the recovery phase for each percent of poverty 
reduction. On the other hand, medium-term growth with no 
improvement of income inequality would represent a slow process of 
poverty abatement: slower than in the cases of high growth and 
equity improvement of the 1970s, and slower than during recent 
growth spells in Colombia and Chile, when income distribution also 
improved. 
8. Ceaelusions. 
After turning the corner of the 1980s, Latin American 
countries are venturing into a new era of potential growth under a 
different pattern of development and a new style of State 
intervention. The adjustments to absorb both exogenous and required 
changes of resource availability and utilization, and the 
structural changes still under way, have imprinted most Latin 
American societies with a more unequal distribution of income and 
a higher incidence of poverty among their people. The few 
exceptions are the result of a deliberate and persistent care for 
equity in economic policy design and implementation. Moreover, the 
prospects for poverty alleviation only through growth, without 
improvement of the relative distribution of incomes and vigorous 
social policies, appear so parsimonious as to be disheartening, 
counterproductive for social integration and, ultimately, for 
sustained growth38. 
Given the weak prospects of primary earnings becoming less 
unequal, even under the deliberate care of economic policy, equity 
improvements and particularly the abatement of absolute poverty 
will have to lean much more on social policy and its effectiveness. 
38 See ECLAC (1990) . 
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But with fiscal resources reduced or still strained by the burden 
of debt, the scope for welfare transfers will be restricted to 
providing only a basic social safety net, ceding more space to 
social expenditures that can be considered as investment in human 
resources. 
Eventual equity gains in the structure of income distribution 
will depend on the spread of productivity improvements and of their 
actual appropriation by households. Structural transformations 
under way tend to increase the productivity of capital and total 
factor productivity, thus enhancing labour productivity in the 
economy at large. However, for income distribution to improve on 
the basis of differential productivity gains, three developments 
are required. First, employment in formal or modern activities has 
to expand, along with productivity increases, as a proportion of 
the labour force, absorbing underemployment. Second, those 
productivity increases have to actually translate into proportional 
wage rises. Third, capital per worker of the labour force remaining 
in the informal, small business and traditional sectors of the 
economy should increase dramatically39. 
Such developments, as well as in general raising the 
productivity of capital, require increasing the skills of the 
different segments of the labour force, and at the same time 
restructuring the availability of skills for enhancing the 
technological capabilities of the productive system at large. For 
achieving that, heavy investment in human resources (education, 
training and retraining, nutrition and health) should supplement 
investment in fixed capital40. Ev enmore, there is some ground for 
substituting investment in human capital for investment in physical 
capital, as far as a greater contribution to total factor 
productivity can be expected from the former, in a long enough 
term. 
Fulfilling these requirements involves substantial amounts of 
investment resources, to be partly originated and handled in the 
marketplace, but in some part to be raised and allocated by the 
State. On the other hand, for higher skills to be reflected on the 
income of earners, pay structures have to face the double challenge 
of being, at the same time, institutionalized and flexible. 
The efficient absorption of capital by the underemployed, the 
effectively widespread access to the acquisition of skills and 
their efficient application to production, the correspondence 
between contributions to productivity and earnings, all call for 
39 Maybe double, for those remaining in such activities, which nevertheless 
would demand much less capital than the amount required for each job created in 
the more modern or "bigger business" activities. 
40 See ECLAC (1992b). 
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substantial organizational improvements at the firm level and deep institutional reforms of public policy« 
Abating structural poverty runs along these same lines, but poses different obstacles than general improvements of income distribution, for policies to be effective. On the one hand, the physical capital required may be lower than in modern activities, 
but the skills gap is greater. On the other hand, effective public policies are more demanding of organizational requirements and institutional creativity. Finally, the remedies have to address the whole vicious circle of circumstances that reproduces poverty from one generation to another. 
Strategies for equity improvement must, take into account th&uB differences. Designing social policy, as has been the usual practice, in a way that actually restricts access mainly to strata above poverty -for which such policies, on the other hand, may be more easily implemented- and thus "dumping" the poor, may concentrate the benefits already integrated segments of society, thus ratifying the disintegration of the poorer strata into a segregated underclass. On the other extreme, a unilateral strategy focusing only on the poor may further debilitate low and middle strata of the population, where a rich reservoir of skills, social cohesion and political dynamism is located. What is required is a "two— tier" strategy, that recognizes existing differences between the poor and the non-poor working population in potential, response and deterioration of life styles and aims at integrating both universes into a single society. 
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Table 1 




concent re tien2' 
Chanoes in poverty incidence " 
National Urban Rural 













Sources Altitair (1992). 
- I: increased; M: maintained; D: decreased. 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA": ESTIMATES OF POVERTY AND DESTITUTION. 1980, 1986, AND 1990 
Poverty" Desti Cut ion0 
Area 1980 1986 1990 1980 1986 1990 
% Mill. % Mill. % Mill. % Mill. % Mill. % Mill. 
(Households) 
National 24.2 35 32.1 37 37.0 39 10.4 15 14.6 17 16.9 18 
Urban 11.8 25 18.7 30 22.7 34 4.1 9 7.0 11 8.7 13 
Rural 12.4 54 13.4 53 14.3 53 6.3 28 7.6 30 8.2 30 
(Persons) 
National 135.9 41 170.2 43 195.9 46 62.4 19 81.4 21 93.5 22 
Urban 62.9 30 94.4 36 115.5 39 22.5 11 35.8 14 44.9 15 
Rural 73.0 60 75.8 60 80.4 61 39.9 33 45.6 36 48.6 37 
Sources: 1980 and 1986: ECLAC (1991); 1990: ECLAC (1992a). 
19 countries. Based on data for: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panera, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, for 
1980 and 1986, and also for Chile, Honduras, and Paraguay for 1990. 
Corresponds to household per capita incomes below poverty lines equivalent to the double of country-spacific rainirctura food budgets, which 
range from 22 to 34 dollars of 1988 per person a month, for the urban areas. 
Corresponds to household per capita incomes below the value of the country-specific minimum food budgets used to draw the poverty lines. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: INCIDENCE OF POVERTY AND DESTITUTION IN THE 1980s 
(% households) 
Country Poverty Destitution 
and Urban Rural National Urban Rural National 
years areas areas level areas areas level 
ARGENTINA 
1980 7 16" 9 2 4" 2 




1979 30 62 39 10 35 17 
1987 34 60 40 13 34 18 
1990 39 56 43 17 31 20 
COLOMBIA 
1980 36 45" 39 13 22" 16 
1986 36 42 38 15 22 17 
1990 35 12 
COSTA RICA 
1981 16 28 22 5 8 6 
1988 21 28 25 6 10 10 
1990 22 25 24 7 12 10 
CHILE 
1980 32° 41° 33° 
1987 37 45 38 13 16 14 
1990 34 36 35 11 15 12 
MEXICO 
1977 32 10 
1984 23 43 30 6 19 10 
PANAMA 
1979 31 45 36 14 27 19 
1986 30 43 34 13 22 16 
1989 34 48 38 15 25 18 
PERU 
1979 35 65" 46 10 38b 21 
1985/86 45 64 52 16 39 25 
URUGUAY 
1981 9 21" 11 2 7" 3 
1986 14 23" 15 3 8b 3 
1989 10 23" 15 2 8" 3 
VENEZUELA 
1981 18 35 22 5 15 7 
1986 25 34 27 8 14 9 
1990 33 38 34 11 17 12 
Source: ECLAC (1991a; 1991b; 1992a). 
° Author's estimate, based on Pollack and Uthoff (1987). See Altimir (1991). 
b These estimates should be considered "educated guesses" based on relevant but indirect information, 
c Author's estimate, based on Beccaria ami Minujin (1991). 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: CHANGES OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN SELECTED PERIODS 
Che nge 0'; Change of Shares of 
! ncoir.3 concentrai ion incaie Groups 
Country Period Source Coverage3 concept a of total incoine) 
Gì ni Rei. 40 l ou 50 int 10 high 
10h/40l 
ARGENTINA 1970-74 Altimir (1986) MA HI 4 9 -0.7 -0.7 1.4 
1974-80 Altimir (1986) m H IPC 10 28 -2.1 -1.2 3.3 
1980-86 ECLAC (1991-b) m HIPC 11 27 -1.5 -3.2 4.7 
1980-89 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) HA HÎPC 17 47 -3.0 5.9 
1985-90 Beccaria (1991) MA HIPC ... 33° -1.4 -3.4s 4.8 
BRAZIL 1979-87 ECLAC (1991-b) MA HIPC 4 32 -2.3 -1.3 3.6 
RU HIPC 7 9 2.7 -5.5 2.8 
1979-89 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) N HIPC 7 28 -1.3 -2.4. 3.7 
1987-89 Hoffmann (1992) U RI 8 51 -2.1® -2.8 4.9 
1987-90 Hoffmann (1992) U RI 2 9 -1.0 - 1.0 
1987-90 ECLAC (1991-b; 1993) MA HIPC -6 •18 0.4 6.3 -6.7 
RU HIPC 1 53 -5.1 5.2 -0.1 
COLOMBIA 1978-88 Londono (1990) N RI -1 -3 -0.2 0.3 -0.5 
1980-86 ECLAC (1991-b) MA HIPC -3 -12 0.2 0 .8 -1.0 
RU HIPC -5 0 0.4 3.0 -3.4 
1980-89 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) U HIPC -9 -27 1.9 3.2 -5.1 
1986-90 ECLAC (1991-b), ECLAC (1993) MA HIPC -2 -1 -0.4 2.7 -2.3 
RU HIPC -9 -2 1.9 1.4 -3.3 
COSTA RICA 1981-88 ECLAC (1991-b) MA HIPC 7 22 -1.5 -1.6 3.1 
RU HIPC 14 3 -1.9 -3.2 5.1 
1981-89 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) N HIPC -3 -10 1.4 -1.9 0.5 
1988-90 ECLAC (1991-b; 1993) MA HIPC -6 -13 1.1 1.1 -2.2 
RU HIPC -6 -15 0.4 3.0 -3.4 
CHILE 1968-74 Heskia (1980) MA HI -10 -23 2.0 1.8 -3.8. 
1974-80 Heskia (1980), Riveros (1985) MA HI 21 60 -2.8 -6.2 9.0' 
1981-83 Riveros (1985) MA HI 2 14 -1.1 -0.5h 1.6' 
1968-83 ECLAC (1979), Rodriguez (1983) N HI 23 38. -1.6 "6.2. 7.8. 
1969-78 Ffrench-Davis-Raczynski (1990) MA HE ... 54J -4.9 -1.6 6.51 
1978-88 Ffrench-Davis-Raczynski (1990) MA HE 23* -1.9 -1.7h 3.61 
1987-90 ECLAC (1991-b; 1991-c) U HIPC -2 -3 0.4 -0.4 -
Table 4 (conclusion) 
Change of Change of Shares of 
income concentration income Groups 
Country Period Source Coverage® concept (%) (% of total income) 
G i ni Rei. 40 low 50 int 10 high 
1Oh/401 
MEXICO 1977-84 ECLAC (1988-b), Lustig (1992) N HI -9 -41 2.8 0.7 -3.5 
1984-89 Lustig (1992) N HI ... 28 -1.4 -3.7 5.1 
PANAMA 1979-89 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) » HIPC 16 66 -3.5 -2.8 6.3 
PERU 1985/6-90 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) m HIPC 2 5 -0.7 0.5 0.2 
URUGUAY 1973-79 Melgar (1981) MA HPI 32 100 -4.7 -8.3 13.0 
1979-81 Melgar (1981), Melgar-Villalobos (1987) MA HPI -2 -4 -1.2 6.3 -5.1 
1981-86 ECLAC (1991-a; 1991-b) MA HIPC 7 20 -1.2 -2.4 3.6 
1986-89 ECLAC (1991-a; 1991-b) MA HIPC -9 -19 1.4 3.1 -4.5 
RU HIPC -7 -12 1.5 0.1 -1.6 
1981-89 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) U HIPC -3 -7 0.8 -0.2 -0.6 
VENEZUELA 1981-86 ECLAC (1991-b) m HIPC 8 19 -2.5 -1.7 4.2 
RU HIPC 18 46 -2.6 -3.1 5.7 
1981-89 Psacharopoulos et al. (1992) H HIPC 3 8 -0.4 -1.3 1.7 
1986-90 ECLAC (1991-b; 1993) MA HIPC -4 -7 0.8 -0.4 -0.4 
RU HIPC - 3 - -0.6 0.6 
1987-89 Harquez-Mukherjee (1991) ¡J HIPC 6 11 -0.2 -3.5 3.7 
1989-90 Marquez-Mukherjee (1991) M HIPC -4 -14 0.9 1.8 -2.7 
a MA: Metropolitan area; RU: rest of urban areas; U: urban areas; N: national. 
b HI: household income; HPI: household primary incomes; HIPC: household income per capita; HE: household expenditure; RI: recipients income, 
c Relation 10h/30l. 
d Corresponds to the low 30%. 
e Corresponds to the intermediate 60%. 
f Relation 10h/50l. 
g Corresponds to the low 50%. 
h Corresponds to the intermediate 40%. 
i Corresponds to the higher 20%. 
j Relation 20h/40l. 
Table 4 
CHANGES IN MACROECOHOMIC AND LABOUR VARIABLES AS3D DISTRIBUTIVE CHANGES IN DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE 19i0s 
(% over each period) 
Macroeconomic variables8 . Labour Eaarketb Distributive Chaoses" 




l . Periosts of recessive adjsis' taent to external shodks 
Argentina 1980-83 -23 77 I -1 37 10 1 8? -19 I? I+? 
BraziI 1979-83 -13 26 1 -18 -5 20 24 f: -7 tî I 
Colombia 1980-83 -5 -12 D 8 7 12 9 21 7 D E9? 
Costa Rica 1980-83 -26 40 I/O -18 -1 12 12 42 -30 I? 
I Chile 1981-83 -22 34 I -11 -19 32 5 H i -8 I 
Mexico 1981-84" -12 40 I -30 -3? 12 7 36 •14 I? I? 
Peru 1982-84 -12 14 I -25 -20 32 31 32 -22 R 
Uruguay 1981-86 -19 55 I -13 -14 a a a » a • 6C -14 i " 1+ 
Venezuela 1981-86 -3C 51 - -19 6 24 6 78 -21 I !<• 
II. Periods s of recovery after external ad. jMstesnt 
Argentina 1983-86 . - D 8 7 10 8 19 14 I I? 
Brazil 1983-87 19 13 D/I 37 -23 -11 -1 -45 42 ! D 
Coloiiibia 1983-86 10 67 I 4 6 4 -2 16 -3 D M 
Costa Rica 1983-88 8 15 I 8 16 -4 8 -25 11 I? D? 
Chile 1983-87 12 72 - -3 -27 -25 -16 -37 -23 I 
Panama 1982-86 10 - 16 13 a a a • a a 2ê -3 M7° 
Peru 1984-87 16 - D/I 40 -3 -15 -7 -4é 28 D? 
D Uruguay 1986-89 13 12 E-1/I 6 -12 a a a • O S -2C -20 D " 
Venezuela 1986-89 -6 52 I -38 -15 -5 4 -2C -20 I Î 
III. Periods of recession due to internal iifoalances 
Argentina 1986-89 -13 34 I/H -19 -62 14 8 36 Î l<r 
BraziI 1987-89 -1 -31 I -11 - -6 -6 -11 " î f I I 
Mexico 1984-87 -8 44 I -16 -17 21 36 -32 -20 s? 
Panama 1986-89 -22 - -1 o • a • e 0 61 -21 Ï? r 
Peru 1987-90 -30 -49 I/H -69 -64 ... ... 73 -58 I? î 
IV. Periods of disinflation ar id recovery 
Argentina 1990-91 5 -24 D -7 39 -IS D 
Mexico 1987-89 2 -11 D -2 -16 "9 14 -7 -10 ! ? " ... 
V. P e r i od s o f growth feey®jid n sco^epy 
Colombia 1986-90 4 31 I -5 -5 -13 -7 -25 20 D D 
Costa Rica 1988-90 - -4 D/I 2 5 -4 1 -14 20 D I 
Chile 1987-90 18 5 I 11 27 -15 1 -45 -3 D D 
Venezuela 1989-90 10 4 D 1 -5 2 - 8 -9 D 
Table 4 (conclusion) 
Source: Changes in macroeconomic and labour variables, ECLAC and PREALC. Distributive changes: tables 3 artd 4. 
a: RMIpc: real national income per capita; RER: real effective exchange rate; INF: inflation. 
b: RW: real urban or industrial wages; RHU: real minimum wage; NALU: non-agricultural labour force undsrutiligation (per active person)equal to 
MALI+UU; tJALI: Non-agricultural labour force in informal activities (PREALC definition); UU: urban isnen^loyment rate; CGpc: real per capita 
government consumption expenditure. 
c: I: increased; l+: increased a lot; D: decreased; M: maintained; "?" indicates most likely presumption for the phase (see text) in the context 
of the changes observed in annex tables 1 and 3 for a longer period. 
d: I: increased; D: decreased; M: inflation rate was maintained; H: entered into hyperinflation. 





CHANGES OF RURAL POVERTY AND OF RELEVANT MACRO VARIABLES IN THE 1980s 
(% over each period) 
Change of Variations ofb: 
Country Period rural poverty0 
RKIpc Agric GDP RER 









COLOMBIA 1980-86 11 47 












































a From estimates in table 3. 
b RNIpc: real national income per capita 
Agric GDP: agricultural product 
RER: real exchange rate 
c 1986-89: -6% 
Table 7 
INEQUALITY, URBAN POVERTY AND MACROECOttOMIC VARIABLES0 AT THE END OF THE 1980s, RELATIVE TO PRE-CRISIS LEVELS 
(Indexes) 
Country Year Base Macro Policy Inequality Urban GDP RNIpc CGpc NALF RU RMW TCRE 
year phase" reformb (Gini) poverty 
(incidence) 
Argentina 1990 (1980 = 100) ST/RY R 113 205 93 69 • a • 88 77 40 185 
Brazil 1990 (1979 = 100) RNU P 108 130 127 97 158 98 85 55 89 
Colombia 1990 (1980 = 100) SDG P 91 96 135 110 125 99 106 108 192 
Costa Rica 1990 (1981 = 100) SDG Y 103 138 128 95 115 103 102 134 90 
Chile 1990 (1981 = 100) SDG Y 113 107 126 104 69 108 96 76 240 
Mexico 1989 (1977 = 100) ST/RY Y 100? >95 147 106 76 89 54 41 111 
Panama 1989 (1979 = 100) RNU N 116 111 116 95 99 • • • 108 93 
Peru 1990 (1979 = 100) RNU R « « * 190 94 72 62 • • • 36 24 40 
Uruguay 1989 (1981 = 100) RVY Y 98 109 100 92 86 • • • 93 76 173 
Venezuela 1990 (1981 = 100) UNG R 110 188 105 72 68 93 48 63 240 
Source: 
° For notation, see table 5. NALF: Index of the proportion of the non - agricultural labour force employed in formal activities (inverse of NALU).' 
b Y: yes, a policy reform package has been put in place; R: reform package recently in place; P: partial reform; N: no significant policy reform. 
Table 4 
CHANGES OF URBAN POVERTY AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHANGES OF CONCENTRATION AND REAL INCOMES, IN DIFFERENT SPELLS 





Chanae of (%>:" 
RNIpc RU RMVj 
Elasticity of urban 
oovertv w/resDect to 
RNIpc RU RKU 
Growth spells in the 1970s 
Brazil 1970-79 M -14 67 48 -1 -0.2 -0.3 14 
Colombia 1970-80 D -21 44 17 27 -0.5 -1.2 -0.8 
Mexico 1970-84 D -30 31 15 -20 -1.0 -2.0 1.5 
Venezuela 1970-81 D -30 71 ... -3 -0.4 -0.4 10 
Recesion and recoverv seeI Is in the 1980s 
Argent i na 1980-86 I 71 -23 7 47 -3.1 10 1.5 
1986-90 I 52 -15 -22 -64 -4.0 -2.4 -0.8 
1990-91 ... -22 5 -7 39 -4.4 3.1 -0.6 
Brazil 1979-87 I 13 3 19 -27 4.2 0.7 -0.5 
1987-90 I 15 -6 -29 -26 -2.5 -0.5 -0.6 
Colombia 1980-86 D - 5 12 13 - -0.1 -
Costa Rica 1981-88 I 31 -5 16 27 -6.5 1.9 1.1 
Chile 1980-87 I 14 -13 -5 -31 -1.1 -2.8 -0.5 
Mexico 1977-84 D -6" 14 -34 -40 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 
Panama 1979-86 I -3 23 14 -6 -0.1 -0.2 0.5 
1986-89 ... 13 -22 -1 -1 -0.6 -13 -13 
Peru 1979-86 29 -7 -5 -39 -4.1 -5.8 -0.7 
Uruguay 1981-86 I 56 -19 -13 -14 -3.0 -4.3 -4.0 
1986-89 D -29 13 6 -12 -2.1 -4.8 2.4 
Venezuela 1981-86 I 39 -31 -19 6 -1.3 -2.1 6.5 
1986-90 D 32 3 -41 -19 9.4 -0.8 -1.7 
Growth SDe l l s at the end of the 1980s 
Colombia 1986-90 D -3 4 -5 -5 -0.7 0.6 0.6 
Costa Rica 1988-90 D 5 -2 2 5 -2.8 2.5 1.0 
Chile 1987-90 D -8 18 11 27 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 
Source: table 5. 
a: For notation, see table 5. b: Corresponds to national poverty. 
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Annex table A.1 
CHANGES IN HACROECONOHIC VARIABLES AND DISTRIBUTIVE CHANGES IN SELECTED PERIODS 
(X over each period) 




Changes in macro variables" 
GDP RNIpc CGpc RER INF" 
Changes in the labour market" Distributive changes % 




1970-74 SDG T,F,C 16 11 11 27 I 18 36 4 -6 8 4 
1974-80 UNG 10 - 15 -48 I -14 -60 24 -55 52 10 
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Colombia 1980-83 RNX 5 -5 
1983-86 RVY 15 10 
1986-90 SDG T,F,S (grd.) 18 4 
Costa Rica 1980-83 RNX -7 -26 
1983-88 RVY T,C,S (grd.) 24 8 
1988-90 SDG 9 -
Chile 1968-74 UNG 19 5 
1974-80 RNX/RVY T.F.C.S.P 14 3 
1981-83 RNX -14 -22 
1983-87 RVY P.L 21 12 
1987-90 SDG 20 18 
Mexico 1977-81 SDG 42 30 
1981-84 RNX/RVY -1 -12 
1984-87 RNU - -8 
1987-89 ST/RY T.F.S.P 5 2 
Panama 1979-82 UNG 26 12 
1982-86 RNX/RVY 8 10 
1986-89 RNU -15 -22 
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Annex table A.1 (conclusion) 
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Venezuela 1981-86 RNX -2 -30 -21 51 M -19 & 24 78 6 12 











Source: Changes in macroeconomic and labour variables: ECLAC and PREALC. Distributive changes: tables 3 end 4. 
a: RNX: recession due to external adjustment; RVY: recovery from external adjustment; RNU: recession due to interned iutolanees/infIation; ST/RY: stabilization 
(from high inflation) and recovery; UNG: growth with instability; SDG: sustained Kedius-terw growth. 
b: Policy reforms: T: trade; F: financial; C: price deregulation; S: fiscal; P: privatizations; I: labour; i@rd.Ss grsdusl. 
c: GDP: gross domestic product; RNIpc: real national income per capita; CGpc: real per capita government consultion expenditure; RER: real effective exchange 
rate; INF: inflation. 
d: I: increased; D: decreased; M: maintained inflation rate; H: entered into hyperinflation. 
e: RU: real urban or industrial wages; RMU: real minimum wage; NALU: non-agricultural labour force underutilizaticn (per active person); equal to UU+NALI; 
UU: urban unemployment rate; NALI: rate of non-agricultural labour force in informal activities (PREALC definition) 
f: National level. 
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